Measuring Cultural Dynamics Through the Eurovision Song Contest by García, David & Tanase, Dorian
David García and Dorian Tanase:
Measuring Cultural Dynamics Through the Eurovision Song Contest
Measuring Cultural Dynamics
Through the Eurovision Song Contest
David García and Dorian Tanase
Chair of Systems Design, ETH Zurich, Weinbergstrasse 56/58
8092 Zurich, Switzerland
dgarcia@ethz.ch, dtanase@alumni.ethz.ch
May 13, 2013
Abstract
Measuring culture and its dynamics through surveys has important limitations, but the
emerging field of computational social science allows us to overcome them by analyzing large-
scale datasets. In this article, we study cultural dynamics through the votes in the Eurovision
song contest, which are decided by a crowd-based scheme in which viewers vote through mo-
bile phone messages. Taking into account asymmetries and imperfect perception of culture,
we measure cultural relations among European countries in terms of cultural affinity. We
propose the Friend-or-Foe coefficient, a metric to measure voting biases among participants
of a Eurovision contest. We validate how this metric represents cultural affinity through its
relation with known cultural distances, and through numerical analysis of biased Eurovision
contests. We apply this metric to the historical set of Eurovision contests from 1975 to 2012,
finding new patterns of stronger modularity than using votes alone. Furthermore, we define a
measure of polarization that, when applied to empirical data, shows a sharp increase within
EU countries during 2010 and 2011. We empirically validate the relation between this po-
larization and economic indicators in the EU, showing how political decisions influence both
the economy and the way citizens relate to the culture of other EU members.
Keywords: Cultural dynamics; international networks; social simulation
1 Introduction
How do cultures evolve? How do they influence each other? These questions are not only central
to human sciences, like anthropology or ethnology, but play a major role in politics, economics,
and international relations. Among the scientific tools to study human cultures, agent-based
modeling provides quantitative insights to culture and opinion dynamics [8]. The original works
of Axelrod [4, 5] motivate how computational modeling can be used to understand the evolution
of human cultures. These agent-based models, while being essential simplifications of a more
complicated phenomenon, allow us to draw the conditions for the emergence of macroscopic
social behavior [6, 8], such as polarization [17] or clustering [35], as well as to predict future
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social phenomena [41, 44]. Furthermore, modeling and simulation can open new questions that
drive future research, allowing –in an ideal case– a deeper understanding of human societies
through multidisciplinary research [18].
As well as sociological theories need to be empirically testable, computational models of social
behavior need to be formulated over assumptions that can be verified against empirical data.
When such behavior is objectively measurable, e.g. economic decisions [9] or voting [12, 31],
datasets can be produced in a way such that we can directly measure the state of a human. On the
other hand, when a model includes subjective elements, such as emotions or beliefs, measuring
the internal states and dynamics of a human becomes a cumbersome task. As an example,
Axelrod’s model introduces the internal state of an agent as a vector of cultural dimensions,
or opinions, which change according to certain rules [4]. To validate this kind of dynamics, we
need to be able to measure the subjective internal state of a human, and how it changes when
interacting with others. While survey data can shed light on opinions and culture [28], there is a
subconscious component of cultural behavior that cannot be encoded in words [47]. Nevertheless,
this component can be indirectly measured, for example through physiological responses [21, 30],
or through online traces such as expression biases [20], and behavioral patterns in computer
mediated interaction [19].
Quantitative models need to be validated on the dynamics of individual states, but are often
aimed to reproduce macroscopically observable collective behavior. When addressing cultures or
societies as a whole, issues of data availability become critical. It can be expensive to query large
amounts of individuals, limiting the application of subjective reports and surveys. In addition,
approaching these questions through experimental studies suffers additional problems. For ex-
ample, experiments cannot reproduce natural exposure in the context of culture and popularity
[36], limiting the representativeness of any experimental study. The emerging field of compu-
tational social science [23, 33] aims at overcoming these limitations, studying human behavior
through the statistical analysis of large-scale datasets. Such datasets, when available, offer the
opportunity to validate the macroscopic behavior explained by computational models of social
interaction. Following the example of Axelrod’s model, its validation requires to measure how
whole cultures change in time, as well as the distances between different cultures.
In this article, we aim at providing a way to measure the relations between cultures through
their voting patterns in a set of song contests, in particular looking for biases in the way they
evaluate each other. This way, we are measuring the dynamics of culture i) at a large-scale level
usually unreachable for independent research, and ii) measuring subjective biases that are not
explicitly expressed by the studied individuals. It is of special relevance to measure these kind
of relations in a timely manner, in order to address possible changes in the relation between
pairs of countries. The political decisions of a country, the results of sport events, or the current
state of the economy might impact the evolution of the public opinion of one society towards
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another. For the case of Europe, the policies of the European Union regarding the debt crisis
might have an impact on the “state of the union”, or how countries within the EU perceive each
other [7]. Studying data with a time component, we measure how these events play a role in the
manifestation of cultural relations, with the aim of providing a macroscope that measures the
state of the union of Europe at large.
2 The Eurovision Song Contest
In this article, we present our study of the relations between European countries through the
set of results of the Eurovision Song Contest, an annual competition held among the country
members of the European Broadcasting Union. Every year, each participating country chooses a
representative artist to compete by performing a song, which is included in a live event broad-
casted simultaneously in the whole Europe. After the performance of each participant, voting
countries gather televotes and jury votes [39], creating a local ranking of songs from other contes-
tants. Afterwards, each voting country publicly announces which other countries receive points
from 1 to 8, 10, and 12, according to their local rankings. The winner of the contest is the
country with the song that accumulated the highest amount of points. Extensive and detailed
descriptions about the contest, its rules, and its history can be found elsewhere [22, 46].
While the contest rules and participating countries have changed over the years, this contest
offers a timely source of cultural evaluations across most European countries. Eurovision has been
subject of substantial research, up to the point of the usage of the term “eurovisiopsephology”
[22], defined as the study of the results of the votes casted in the Eurovision song contest.
Initial research focused on the possible existence of voting clusters or alliances [45, 46], generally
due to geographical locations, diaspora effects, language, and religious similarities [43]. Further
studies combined network analysis with simulations of maximally random contests, revealing how
Eurovision results have high clustering [15], which results in voting blocks [22, 39], and higher
chances to win for countries depending on their position in the voting network [13, 42].
Since 2004, all the countries participating in the contest choose their votes according to televoting,
a method that uses phone calls and mobile phone messages of viewers to decide how a country
votes. Since 2009, these televotes were combined with some expert judges, turning Eurovision
in an experimental ground to compare popular and expert choices. Recent studies show the
statistical changes due to televoting [39], while older works measure how expert judges chose
their votes according to song quality rather than cultural biases [27]. Either way, the results of
this contest highlight the stable cultural relations between countries [43], where voting trades or
game theoretical decisions do not seem to play a role [24].
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2.1 Controversies and applications
Recently, Google set up a Eurovision predictor based on search queries, leading to the correct
prediction in 2009 and 20101 . This was discontinued in 2011, after a contested prediction result
between Lena, the previous German winner who was competing again, and the Irish participants
called Jedward2. The outcome of this prediction failed, as both countries were defeated by Azer-
baijan by more than 100 points. In addition, seems that users were exploiting the search engine
to try to push their country higher in the prediction3, as if searching for your representative
would increase its chance to win. This reaction to a prediction mechanism shows how social
systems, as complex adaptive systems, can change their behavior due research results, leading
to the invalidation of prediction tools or even to self-fulfilling predictions.
Our approach does not aim to predict contest outcomes or to reveal voting alliances, but to use
Eurovision as a social macroscope for the relations across European countries. Initial results show
how Eurovision outcomes can predict international trade [14, 32], which motivates the measuring
of the cohesion of European countries and the EU through Eurovision [39]. Popular culture
and mass media criticize the contest organization, claiming that some countries are treated as
European only in Eurovision4, as a limitation for a “Europeaniziation process”[29]. In addition,
the contest rules and results are periodically claimed to be unfair, biased5 , or even farcical6,
portraying the contest as a European popularity survey rather than an artistic competition.
In this article, we precisely aim to measure these biases as relevant quantities, focusing on the
political, social, and cultural component of the contest rather than on its artistic one.
2.2 Exploring Eurovision data
We gathered the whole historical set of Eurovision results from Wikipedia7, which contains a
page for each edition of the contest, and from the official website of the contest8. For each year,
we count with a matrix with the values pv,c, where each entry corresponds to the amount of
points given by a country cv to the competing song of another country cc. As explained before,
pv,c is contained in the set {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12}, and chosen according to the ranking of
televotes and jury votes. Our dataset comprises the whole set of results of Eurovision editions
1calmyourbeans.wordpress.com/2012/05/22/no-google-eurovision-predictor-this-year/
2wiwibloggs.com/2011/05/07/google-prediction-jedwards-lead-grows-denmark-and-estonia-climbing-update-2/
10942/
3thedailyedge.thejournal.ie/google-trends-predict-eurovision-near-miss-for-jedward-130899-May2011/
4 “I’m sick of being European just on Eurosong” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IK8fVHNk0oM
5http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/wales/south_east/3719157.stm
6http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/6654719.stm
7For an example of a contest result page, see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurovision_Song_Contest_
2012
8http://www.eurovision.tv/page/history/year
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from 1957 to 2012, including 11775 voting relations between 51 country members of the European
Broadcasting Union.
The straightforward approach to understand this data is to look into the voting network formed
every year [15], where nodes are participating countries. A directed edge cv → cc connects two
nodes if cv assigned that year a nonzero amount of points to cc. Edge weights are assigned to
be the amount of points given by the vote, pv,c. Figure 1 shows this network for the edition of
2008, with edge darkness according to weight, and node darkness proportional to the final score
sc =
∑
cv
pv,c of each country cc in the contest. The topological properties of these networks have
been widely explored, finding symmetrical relations, triadic clustering, and highly connected
blocks that map to geographically close, and culturally related countries [22, 42, 46].
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Russia
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Bosnia and Herzegovina
Slovenia
Iceland
Croatia
Finland
Germany
Hungary
Ireland
Georgia
Montenegro
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Azerbaijan
Greece
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Lithuania
Malta
Serbia
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Romania
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France
Ukraine
Figure 1: Network of votes for the 2008 edition of Eurovision. Nodes are participating countries,
with color darkness proportional to the final score of the country. Directed edges represent the
votes given by one country to another, with darker color according to the amount of points given
by the vote.
Visual inspection of this network, as shown in Figure 1, reveals a significant heterogeneity in node
darkness. This corresponds to the large deviation of final scores usually present in this contest.
Initial editions of the contest had multiple draws, so the voting scheme was changed to the current
one in 1975, in order to encourage the selection of a single winner. The resulting heterogeneity is
relevant to test the existence of winner-takes-all effects as in cultural markets [40], and product
reviews [34]. To do so, we calculated the relative score s′c =
sc
T , where T =
∑
cc
sc is the total
amount of points given in an edition of the contest, which depends on the amount of countries
participating in a given year. This way we can aggregate all participant scores since 1975, as
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shown in the histogram of Figure 2. Similarly to the cultural markets mentioned above, the
distribution of s′ shows a large variance, and positive skewness. On the other hand, the log-log
histogram shown in the inset of Figure 2 allows us to notice that there are no scaling relations,
probably due to the finite size of the contest. We can say that the contest has a large variance of
final scores, yet these do not allow arbitrarily large values, as opposed to previous experience in
popularity analysis. We will use these final scores to compare individual votes with final results,
as explained below.
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Figure 2: Relative score s′ distribution for contest results from 1975 to 2012. Inset: log-log version
of the distribution. We use this empirical distribution as input for our simulations.
3 Measuring cultural relations through Eurovision
3.1 Perception of culture
Most agent-based models of culture dynamics include agent interactions based on their internal
states, usually depending on the distance between the values of their cultural features. While
valid to reproduce the emergence of opinion groups and cultures [37], there is still ample room
to validate and empirically test the existence of this kind of dynamics. The existence of cultural
dimensions was first introduced by Hofstede [28], in a study of surveys across different countries.
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These dimensions were detected by means of dimensionality reduction on survey responses, and
have been applied in numerous studies about culture [16], including a study on Eurovision [24].
On the other hand, measuring culture through surveys has clear limitations [1], in particular in
the interpretation of the meaning of the results of dimensionality reduction.
Apart from dimensional structures, a key component in models of culture dynamics is the set of
rules that determine which agents interact and how. While these rules can represent spontaneous
events of influence between cultures, in other scenarios work as a mechanism in which agents
perceive the state of others. In a realistic setup, the perception of cultural differences might
be constrained by imperfect communication, and path dependencies like historical events or
stereotypes. Such phenomena can shape the way culture is perceived across a society, leading
to new structures to take into account in future models. It is important to highlight that these
structures and dynamics depend on the societal level at which culture is defined, which can
include countries [28], ethnic groups [3], or firm clusters [26].
With the minimal assumption that humans can only perceive a set of dimensions from another
culture, the perceived distance between cultures could have asymmetric properties. In the schema
of Figure 3, we sketch two cultures with binary feature vectors of five dimensions. If the left one
can only perceive the three first features of the other, its perceived Hamming distance would be
1, as they just differ in the third feature. At the same time, if the right one can only perceive
the last three features of the left one, the perceived distance would be 3, leading to asymmetric
perception of cultural differences.
Another possibility is that each society might have a reference point, i.e. an expected or “accept-
able” maximum cultural distance towards another. This would lead to the existence of negative
cultural relations, which would be a plausible explanation for multiple international conflicts
present in History. This possibility is commonly ignored when taking into account cultural dis-
tances in discrete spaces, and might very well be a property of realistic cultural dynamics.
Given possible asymmetries and signed values, we will define cultural affinity of a society towards
another as “the differences perceived by the members of a society in relation to the culture of an-
other society, evaluated as a comparison with a reference point”. Cultural affinity takes maximum
values for very close cultures, and negative values towards very different cultures.
In this article, we analyze cultures at the country level, aggregating individuals according to the
country in which they live. By analyzing Eurovison results, we want to explore the asymmetry
in the perceived differences between cultures, and the existence of negative and positive cultural
evaluations among the cultures of European countries. This datasource implies a salience of
musical tastes as a feature of culture. Nevertheless, we will focus on the patterns of cultural
affinity to explore the relation between Eurovision votes and other factors, including Hofstede’s
cultural dimensions and economic relations.
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} }31
Figure 3: Schema with a possible scenario of feature-based cultures under imperfect perception.
Each culture is composed of a set of agents with the same values of the cultural vector, shown
over them. Their asymmetric relation is a result of partial perception of the cultural features of
the other.
3.2 The Friend-or-Foe coefficient
To measure cultural affinity, we need to define a way to estimate it from the raw Eurovision
scores of our dataset. For this, we define the Friend-or-Foe (FoF) coefficient of country cv towards
country cc, as estimated from a particular edition of the contest:
Fof(cv, cc) =
pv,c
12
− sc − pv,c
12(N − 2) (1)
where pv,c are the points assigned to cc by cv, sc is the final score of cc, and N is the total amount
of countries voting in the studied edition of Eurovision. The first term of the right hand side
of Equation 1 represents a normalized value of the score given by cv to cc, ranging from 0 for
no points given, to 1 when 12 points were assigned to cc. The second term corrects for the final
score of cc in the whole contest, calculating the total amount of points given by other countries
different than cv. The maximum value of this score is 12(N − 2), as one country cannot vote
itself and we have already subtracted cv from the calculation.
We designed the Friend-or-Foe coefficient to measure the overvoting or undervoting bias from
a country to another, correcting for “song quality” as estimated by the final contest result [24].
This way, we aim at removing the effects of the artistic component of the contest, highlighting
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the political or cultural biases that are commonly claimed to exist in Eurovision. If a country
cv assigns 12 points to cc, while all the others assign 0, then FoF (cv, cc) = 1, which would be
the maximum value of an overvoting bias. If cv assigns 0 points to cc but all the other countries
assign 12, then FoF (cv, cc) = −1, representing the maximally negative Friend-or-Foe coefficient
given the contest rules.
After this definition, we need to assess if the FoF is a valid measure to estimate the real cultural
affinity of one country towards another, as described above. In the following, we test the relation
between the FoF and previously know cultural distances between European cultures. Further-
more, we explore some examples of country pairs with known cultural similarities, as well as
countries with explicit conflicts.
3.3 Relation between culture and FoF
For any pair of countries c1 and c2 we can calculate the FoF coefficients between them in each
contest in which they participated together. The values of FoF (c1, c2) and FoF (c2, c1) might
depend on effects that influence Eurovision votes, including cultural affinity. In this section, we
show the relation between culture and the FoF, using two metrics on independent datasets:
• Mean FoF. We aggregate the FoF coefficients for each pair of countries through
FoF (c1, c2) =
1
Mc1,c2
∑
t FoFt(c1, c2) where FoFt(c1, c2) is the FoF between c1 and c2 on
year t and Mc1,c2 is the amount of times both countries participated together since 1975.
• Cultural distance. We take as a ground truth the quantization of cultural distances
provided by Hofstede [28]9, including 17 countries that have participated in Eurovision10.
This way, for each country c, we have measures of four different cultural dimensions: Power
Distance pc, Individualism ic, Masculinity mc, and Uncertainty Avoidance uc. We calculate
the cultural distance between the countries c1 and c2 as
d(c1, c2) =
1
100
(|pc1 − pc2 |+ |ic1 − ic2 |+ |mc1 −mc2 |+ |uc1 − uc2 |) (2)
which corresponds to the Manhattan distance between both cultures, rescaling each dimen-
sion.
These two metrics are constrained by the availability of data, as we need enough values of the
FoF to calculate their mean. Taking pairs that co-participated in Eurovision more than 25 times
9These values can be browsed at http://geert-hofstede.com/dimensions.html
10Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Netherlands, Norway, Portu-
gal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom
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Figure 4: Scatter plot of the mean Friend-or-Foe coefficient (1975-2012) versus Hofstede’s cultural
distance between countries that participated together in Eurovision more than 25 times since
1975. Barplot shows mean and standard error in 10 bins, and the solid line shows the linear
regression result (R2 = 0.1946, p < 10−10).
leaves us with a total of 206 country pairs, which account for more than 75% of all the possible
pairs of countries included here. Figure 4 shows a scatter plot of FoF (c1, c2) versus d(c1, c2),
with superimposed mean values of FoF (c1, c2) in 10 bins of d(c1, c2). There is a pattern of
declining FoF (c1, c2) for country pairs with higher cultural distances. The Pearson’s correlation
coefficient between the mean FoF and the cultural distance is −0.441, in a 95% confidence interval
of [−0.545,−0.324], and with p < 10−10.
Additionally, we calculated the linear regression of FoF (c1, c2) as a function of d(c1, c2), finding
that the weight of cultural distance is significant and estimated as −0.09558. The result of this
linear regression is shown as a solid line in Figure 4, which crosses 0 at a point close to distance
1. This suggests the existence of a reference point, beyond which we can expect two countries to
undervote each other, i.e. have negative FoF if their cultures are at a distance above 1.
To gain deeper knowledge on this relation between cultures and the FoF, we show four examples
of country pairs and their FoF, shown in Figure 5. These examples illustrate three properties of
the FoF:
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Figure 5: Examples of yearly Friend or Foe coefficients, for the pairs A: (Cyprus, Greece), B:
(Armenia, Azerbaijan), C: (Norway, Greece), and D: (Armenia, Turkey).
• Cultural proximity. The standard example for the expression of cultural similarity in
Eurovision is Cyprus and Greece [15, 22, 39]. Figure 5A shows the FoF between these two
countries from 2002 until 2012. Both values are positive in each edition of the contest,
never dropping below 0.3. This example is in line with our above analysis of the relation
between FoF and cultural distance, were Cyprus and Greece is an extreme point with very
low distance.
• Asymmetric effects. The FoF pair of Turkey and Armenia, shown in Figure 5D is a
clear example of an asymmetric relation between countries. FoF (Turkey,Armenia) keeps
a significantly positive value, hypothetically due to Armenian diaspora living in Turkey.
This same effect of ’patriotic voting’ was suggested for Turkish migrants across Europe [43],
and our FoF coefficient reflects it in this case. On the other hand, FoF (Armenia, Turkey)
is significantly low and mostly below 0. This negative relation is a possible expression
of negative relations due to historical conflicts between both countries. We analyze these
asymmetries at a global level in our modularity analysis of Section 5.2.
• Negative relations.We want to explore the possibility of negative relations between pairs
of countries. Couples of countries with explicit territorial conflicts show this symmetric
negative FoFs, as shown in Figure 5B. Armenia and Azerbaijan are still officially in war
since the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict11. This negativity is evident in their FoF coefficients,
11http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nagorno-Karabakh_War
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as these countries consistently avoid voting each other. The example of Greece and Norway
in Figure 5C shows that negative FoF can indicate negative cultural affinity as well. The
cultural distance between Norway and Greece is 1.74, placing this pair as one of the most
distant cultures, beyond the reference point of 1, and thus having negative FoF coefficients.
4 Analysis and simulation of biased contests
4.1 Properties of the Friend-or-Foe coefficient
The FoF is an indirect measure of the underlying cultural affinity between countries, and the
contest rules or the artistic component of the performances can influence this metric. In this
section, we provide a detailed analysis of the FoF coefficient based on simulations, comparing
the influence of contest rules and cultural affinities in the Friend-or-Foe coefficient.
By definition, the mean of the FoF values directed to a particular country is 0:∑
cv
FoF (cv, cc) =
∑
cv
pv,c
12
− sc − pv,c
12(N − 2) = −(N − 1)
sc
12(N − 2) +
∑
cv
(N − 1)pv,c
12(N − 2) (3)
,
∑
cv
pv,c = sc and there are N − 1 countries that can vote cc, leading to a total sum of 0.
According to this property, the expected value of the FoF between random pair of countries is
0. Beyond this zero mean, we can expect the distribution of FoF for a contest to be far from
uniform, and not all sc and pv,c are equally likely in the empirical data.
The FoF increases linearly with the score given from one country to another, and decreases with
the final score of the voted country. The left panel of Figure 6 shows the value of the FoF for
different combinations of pv,c and sc, in a contest with 43 voting countries. The possible FoF
values allows a range from 1 when a country gives 12 points to another with a final score of
12, to -1 when a country gives 0 points to another that got 12 points from each other country.
Both cases are possible, but the latter seems much less likely under the skewed distribution of
final results shown in Figure 2. In particular, the maximum amount of points ever achieved by a
participant in Eurovision is smax = 387, added as a vertical line in Figure 6. Without additional
knowledge of the contest, this would suggest that the FoF has a tendency towards positive values,
as there would be more possible combinations of sc and pv,c giving a FoF above 0.
The skewness of the final scores is not the only factor that can shapes the FoF. Due to the
contest rules, voting countries have a fixed voting scheme, which assigns the fixed values of
[1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12] to 10 other participants, and 0 to all the rest. This implies that a value
of pv,c = 0 is much more likely than any other, i.e. the black dots of Figure 6 would appear more
often in a contest. Given sc > 0, a pv,c = 0 would imply a negative FoF, suggesting a negative
tendency in the FoF values as opposed with the positive one explained above.
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Figure 6: Left: FoF (cv, cc) values corresponding to the different possible combinations of pv,c
and sc, in a contest with N = 43. Right: histogram of empirical values of pairs pv,c, sc/T for
contests in the period 1997-2012, ranging from blue to green proportionally to density. Barplots
show the histograms of sc/T (top), and pv,c (right).
The combination of these two statistical effects can be seen in the right panel of Figure 6, in a
histogram of the combination of possible votes pv,c and rescaled final scores sc/T , for all contests
from 1997 until 2012. We focus on this period since it was in 1997 when televoting introduced,
adding additional social value to the Eurovision data. First, the rescaled final scores are very far
from being uniformly distributed, indicating the positive FoF tendency explained above. Second,
most of the pv,c values are 0, suggesting the negative FoF tendency created by the rules of the
contest. The historical distribution of FoF shows these effects, as shown in Figure 7A. Negative
FoF values are more likely, but are also smaller in magnitude than positive ones, giving the a
mean of zero. The effect of the voting scheme can be seen in Figure 7B and C, where we show
the histogram of FoF when pv,c = 0 in the former, and when pv,c > 0 in the latter. A score of 0
ensures a maximum FoF of 0, while a score above 0 allows both positive and negative FoF. On
the other hand, the FoF when pv,c > 0 have a positive mean, as high final scores happen only
for very few participants.
In addition, the shape of the distribution of FoF does not significantly change over the year.
Figure 7D shows the distributions of FoF from 1997 to 2012, revealing that different contest sizes
do not create additional biases.
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Figure 7: A) Histogram of FoF values for all contests between 1997 and 2012. B) Histogram of
FoF when pv,c = 0, and C) when pv,c > 0. D) Distribution of the FoF values for each yearly
edition of Eurovision between 1997 and 2012.
4.2 Modeling Eurovision contests
The above empirical analysis shows the existence of biases in the FoF, but it still can contain
relevant information about the cultural affinity across countries. In the following, we show a
numerical comparison of simulated Eurovision contests, increasingly including the contest rules,
heterogeneity in song quality, and cultural affinities. We start defining a null model, in which
countries can freely vote other countries with the only restriction of assigning a fixed amount of
points:
Null model
For each voting country cv:
1. For each competing country cc:
• Sample fitv[cc] from uniform distribution between 0 and 1
2. For each competing country cc:
• Assign pv,c = 58 ∗ fitv [cc]∑
c fitv [c]
In the null model, countries choose the votes they assign to other countries at random, under the
unique constraint that the sum of scores they can assign is a fixed value. We used this null model
as a reference point to quantify the effect that the voting scheme has on the distribution of FoF.
To do so, we use the minimal model of random votes under the voting scheme of Eurovision,
introduced in [22]:
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Model 1
scores = [12, 10, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1]
For each voting country cv:
1. For each competing country cc:
• Sample fitv[cc] from uniform distribution between 0 and 1
2. For each competing country cc:
• If rank(fitv[cc]) ≤ 10: assign pv,c = scores[rank(fitv[cc])]
• Else: assign pv,c = 0
Previous works compared the network properties of the votes in this model with empirical data
[15]. In our study, we use this model to assess the effect of the voting scheme in the distribution
of FoF. For each contest between 1997 and 2012, we run 100 simulations of the null model and
model 1, using the same amount of voting and competing countries. We computed the FoF values
for each of the simulations, producing a simulated dataset of FoF values 100 times larger than
the empirical FoF data.
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Figure 8: Distribution of FoF values in contests between 1997 and 2012 (red circles), compared
with 10 simulations of the null model (gray points), and of model 1 (black squares).
Figure 8 shows the historical FoF distribution, compared with the distributions from simulations
of the null model and model 1. It is easy to notice that the empirical distribution is significantly
different from the other two. We calculated goodness of fit values for these differences, finding
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a R2 = 0.326 and a Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic of 0.29 for the difference between the null
model and the empirical data. For the case of model 1, the fit improved to a R2 = 0.567 and the
KS statistic to 0.18, but these values allow us to conclude that the empirical FoF distribution is
significantly different from both models (KS test gave p < 10−15 for both).
4.3 A model for cultural affinity in Eurovision
The above quantitative analysis reveals that the empirical FoF values cannot be explained by
random behavior under the contest rules. In the following, we propose a model to simulate
Eurovision contests under heterogeneous song quality and the influence of cultural affinity, aiming
at a better representation of the mechanism behind the voting decisions of the participants.
The model receives as an input a network in which nodes represent countries, connected by
edges with weights that represent cultural affinities, i.e. a measure that takes high positive values
for culturally similar countries, and negative values for dissimilar cultures. Thus, an edge ev,c
connecting the node of country cv to the node of country cc has a weight wv,c that measures the
cultural affinity of cv towards cc. This network is composed of two subnetworks, with participant
and only voting countries. The subnetwork between participants is fully connected, directed,
weighted network, and the only voting countries are connected to all the participant ones by
unidirectional weighted links.
At the beginning of a simulation, we assign a quality value q to each participant, sampled
uniformly at random from the distribution of rescaled scores s′c, shown in Figure 2. This value
is an approximation of the artistic quality of a song [24], which can be assumed to influence the
final outcome of the contest. Then the affinity model is simulated as follows:
16/35
David García and Dorian Tanase:
Measuring Cultural Dynamics Through the Eurovision Song Contest
Affinity Model
scores = [12, 10, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1]
w = affinity network
For each competing country cc:
• sample q[cc] from empirical s′c distribution
For each voting country cv:
1. For each competing country cc:
• assign fitv[cc] = αq[cc] + (1− α)wv,c
2. For each competing country cc:
• If rank(fitv[cc]) ≤ 10: assign pv,c = scores[rank(fitv[cc])]
• Else: assign pv,c = 0
In the first step of the simulation, a country cv constructs a local ranking of the other participant
countries, by computing a value fitv[cc] that is a function of the weight wv,c of the edge ev,c,
and the quality of the song, q[cc]. We assume that this function is a combination of both the
quality and the affinity, monotonically increasing with both. As an initial approximation, we
assume a linear combination of the form αq[cc] + (1− α)wv,c, but future research can shed light
on how countries combine quality and cultural affinities when voting in Eurovision. This function
represents the combination of jury votes and televotes, as empirical studies show that the jury is
more influenced by the artistic quality of a song than the televotes [27], which seem to be driven
by geographical and cultural biases. The current rules of the contest give the same weight to
both televotes and judge votes, so we will choose α = 0.5 for our simulations. In the second step,
given the rank of each node, the agents cast their votes in order, assigning them according to
the voting scheme of Eurovision.
Under the lack of any other alternative assumption, we take edge weights wv,c sampled from
a normal distribution N(µ, σ) with parametrized values of the mean and standard deviation.
We will explore the role of these two values in reproducing the FoF distribution. The output
of the model is an artificial voting result that can be compared with the real world data. In
the following, we present an analysis of the conditions under which this model provides a more
plausible FoF distribution, as compared to empirical data.
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4.4 Simulated FoF distributions
To compare our model with the empirical FoF, we run a simulation scheme that included all the
combinations of values of µ in [−0.1, 0.1] in increments of 0.01 and σ in [0, 0.1] in increments of
0.005. For each combination of parameter values, the model was run 100 times, and the resulting
FoF values were stored to be compared with the empirical data.
To minimize computational efforts, we simulated a contest with 43 voting countries and 25
competing ones, which are values close to the current editions of Eurovision. In our empirical
validation, we focus in the time range from 2004 until 2012, where the current final structure was
introduced. While the amounts of participants vary within this period, their change is around 2
to 3 countries, allowing us to use the same set of simulations to compare across years.
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Figure 9: Distribution of empirical FoF values (red circles) between 2008 and 2012, compared
to best fits of the affinity model (black triangles).
After all simulations were run, we fitted the empirical FoF distribution of each year against all
the combinations of parameter values. Our criterion to select the best fitting values was the
minimization of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic [11]. Figure 9 shows the model fit to the last
five editions of Eurovision. Generally, the model correctly captures the shape of the distribution,
with some discrepancies in 2010, where a second negative mode appears, and 2011, where the
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median is shifted to the left. In Section 6 we provide a more detailed analysis of the reasons that
can explain these anomalies.
Figure 10 shows the R2 values for the best fits of the affinity model versus the FoF distributions
of each year, as well as the R2 of the null model and model 1 as explained in Section 4.2. The
goodness of fit of the affinity model is above the other two for all years, typically explaining
an additional 40% of the variance of the FoF distribution. While the R2 shows that the affinity
distribution plays an important role, this affinity model is still insufficient to capture all the
dynamics that produce the shape of the FoF distribution. The results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
tests gave distances between 0.06 and 0.12, with p values below 10−5 for each year. This test
shows that we can reject the hypothesis that simulated and empirical FoF come from the same
distribution. Nevertheless, the better fit of the affinity model in comparison with the null model
and model 1 allows us to validate that the FoF coefficient reflects the network of affinity between
countries, yet the model definition can be improved.
The values of µ and σ for the best fit of each year contain information on what is the most likely
distribution of cultural affinities. For each year, the best fitting σ have the same value of 0.075,
while the best fitting µ span equally across positive and negative values. This latter fact is not
surprising, as the rank transformation of the affinity model destroys the influence of the mean
of the affinity distribution. We can say that, in the range of explored values, µ acts as a free
parameter, and σ as a constant.
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Figure 10: R2 values for model fits for the FoF distributions between 2004 and 2012. The values
reported for the affinity model correspond to the best fitting parameter values for the affinity
distribution, and for µ = 0, σ = 0.
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Among the parameter values of our simulations, an interesting case is µ = 0, σ = 0, which
corresponds to the deterministic case in which song quality is the only criterion for choosing
the votes. In that case, cultural affinity does not influence the simulated votes, and only song
heterogeneity and contest rules account for the final FoF values. The quality of the fit in that
case is also shown in Figure 10, revealing the inconsistent quality of ignoring affinity as a fac-
tor in the model simulation. From these results we conclude that the Friend-or-Foe coefficient
indeed contains significant information about the affinities among participant countries, and its
distribution of values cannot be explained by the contest rules alone.
5 Empirical analysis of FoF networks
5.1 Votes and FoF networks
The above numerical analysis draws a connection between cultural affinities and the Friend-or-
Foe coefficient. When analyzing empirical Eurovision data, it follows to ask whether the FoF can
be used to reveal patterns beyond those that can be found analyzing voting scores alone, which
is the standard technique used in previous research [13, 45]. This traditional approach models
the result of a Eurovision contest as a network in which nodes represent participating countries,
and directed edges connect nodes with weights according to the points assigned in the contest.
We define a new type of network with the same nodes, but fully connected with directed edges
e(v, c) with signed weights corresponding to FoF (cv, cc).
We explore the time aggregation of these networks by averaging the scores and FoF between
each pair of countries that has participated in Eurovision. We focus on the time interval between
1997 and 2012, capturing the contest results since televoting was introduced. This leads to two
different networks: a mean score network with mean scores as edge weights, and a mean FoF
network with mean Friend-or-Foe coefficients as weights. These two networks are shown in Figure
11, visualized with the the Cuttlefish Network Workbench 12.
A common research question on eurovipsephology is the analysis of clusters and subcommunities
among participant countries. A variety of data transformations and techniques have been applied,
including dimensionality reduction of reciprocal structures [46] and correlations [15], numerical
comparisons at certain significance levels [13, 22], clusters created by discarding votes below
varying thresholds [13, 42], and techniques to find overlapping voting clusters [39]. The current
state of the art in community detection is based on Q-modularity [38], which has previously been
applied to assess the quality of threshold-based dendrograms in Eurovision [42]. In the following,
we define and apply two metrics to quantify and compare the modularity of the votes and FoF
networks.
12www.cuttlefish.sourceforge.net
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Figure 11: Left: mean score network between countries for the period 1997-2012. Edge darkness
and widths are proportional to the average score from one country to another, and nodes are
located in four communities according to maximal weighted modularity. Right: mean FoF network
for the same period, displaying negative FoF in red, and positive Fof in blue. Edge width and
darkness are proportional to the absolute value of FoF. Nodes are arranged in five communities
according to maximal weighted, signed modularity.
5.2 Modularity metrics
The modularity of the mean score network can be measured with respect to a partition of the
nodes Ci, which assigns a community value to each node i. This partition is quantified through
the function δ(Cv, Cc), which has value 1 if v and c belong to the same community, and 0
otherwise. In this setup, we can compare the modularity of a partition of the network with the
random case, by means of the following equation [38]:
Qs =
1
2S
∑
v
∑
c
(
pv,c −
poutv p
in
c
2S
)
δ(Cv, Cc) (4)
where pv,c is the mean score that cv has given to cc, poutv =
∑
i pv,i, p
in
c =
∑
i pi,c = sc and S
is the total amount of points given in the contest. Since the contest rules were fixed in 1975,
poutv = 58, and S = 58Nv, but the problem of finding the best community structure is still
NP-hard, requiring approximated algorithms when networks are not very small.
In our mean score network, the weights of the links are assigned as the mean score a country
gives to another, calculated over the 16 contests between 1997 and 2012. This way we do not set
any ad hoc threshold, and we account for all the data available since televoting was introduced in
the contest. We computed optimal communities through 10000 bootstrapped heuristic searches
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[2], finding four communities with a modularity of 0.166. The layout of the left network of Figure
11 shows these four differentiated subcommunities.
The mean FoF network differs from the mean score network in the fact that it contains signed
weights, as mean FoF values can be negative. To make use of this feature, we use the definition
of signed, weighted modularity [25]:
Qfof =
1
2f+ + 2f−
∑
v
∑
c
[
Fof(cv, cc)−
(
f+,outv f
+,in
c
2f+
− f
−,out
v f
−,in
c
2f−
)]
δ(Cv, Cc) (5)
where f± are the total sums of positive and negative FoF values, and f±,in/outc are the sums of
incoming and outgoing positive and negative FoF values for country cc. The rationale behind
Equation 5 is to measure the density of positive and negative FoF inside the communities, com-
pared with the random case of an uncorrelated network. Qfof will increase when the communities
contain more positive FoF, as well as when the negative FoF are kept across communities.
We run over the mean Fof network the same method as for the mean score network, looking
for partitions that maximize the internal positive FoF of the communities, while minimizing the
amount of internal negative FoF at the same time. The right network of Figure 11 shows the five
clusters we found, having Qfof = 0.252. This higher modularity of the mean FoF network, in
comparison with the mean score network, reveals the added value of the Friend-or-Foe coefficient.
We found a network partition that differs more from the random case, as compared with the
mean score network, as the Q-modularity is lower when ignoring the final result of the contest.
5.3 Dynamics of modularity and polarization
While above modularity metrics highlight subcommunities, other patterns might arise from the
results of Eurovision contests. From a macroscopic point of view, FoF values can reveal different
levels of strength in the biases of country votes, without assuming any particular division in
communities. To measure this overall level of “disagreement” across participants, we define the
polarization of FoF as:
Pol(t) =
√
1
Et
∑
c,v
(FoFt(cc, cv)− 〈FoFt〉)2 (6)
which is essentially the standard deviation of FoF across all the pairs of countries in the network,
which amount to Et. This polarization metric takes higher values when voting biases are strong,
in comparison to the artistic component of the contest. If all countries agreed on the best songs
in the same manner, the polarization would have a value close to zero.
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The definition of polarization of Equation 6 allows us to track the overall strength of individual
biases in the history of Eurovision. Similarly, we extend the definitions of modularity explained
above, aiming to measure the modularity in the scores network Qs(t) and the FoF network
Qfof (t) of each year t. These two time series of modularities are calculated as Equations 4 and
5, substituting average values with the instances of each year ,pv,c(t), and FoFt(cc, cv).
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Figure 12: Time series of votes modularity Qs (black points), FoF modularity Qfof (circles), and
polarization (gray triangles).
Figure 12 shows the time series of both modularities and polarization. Our first observation is
an increasing pattern of Qs, having always values below Qfof , with the exception of 2011. As
mentioned in Section 2.1, the organization of the Eurovision song contest has been accused of
having an increasing level of unfairness and lack of artistic content. This is in line with the
increasing pattern of Qs, which we validated by measuring the correlation between Qs and t,
which has a value of 0.817 (p-value= 0.0001097).
The score modularity approaches the FoF modularity from below, which seems to keep constant
through the ovserved time period. Testing this, we computed the correlation between Qfof (t)
and t finding a value of 0.402 with low significance (p-value = 0.1224). This lack of a linear trend
in Qfof shows how the FoF reveal rather stable patterns of European culture, as opposed with
the increasing pattern of modularity in the scores.
We observe a rather stable level of polarization, which we test by calculating the correlation
between Pol(t) and t. This calculation gives a value of 0.521 under a significance level that
very arguable could reject the null hypothesis (p-value = 0.03816). Therefore, we refrain from
concluding that the polarization of FoF shows any linear time pattern of generalized biases, when
looking at all the countries participating in Eurovision. In the following section, we focus on a
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subset of the countries participating in Eurovision, testing the relation between their economic
situation and the FoF polarization among them.
6 Cultural affinity and economy in the EU
6.1 The EU-15 subnetwork
One of the main motivations for studying Eurovision data is its representativeness of the whole
Europe, giving the possibility to study the relations among countries. It is particularly relevant to
explore its relation to the events of the European debt crisis, testing if there is a relation between
cultural affinity and the economy at large. In this section, we focus on a subset of countries called
the EU-15, which is the set of members of the European Union since 1995.
Figure 13 shows the EU-15 FoF subnetworks for the contest editions between 2007 and 2012. Blue
edges represent positive FoF with width and darkness proportional to the FoF of one country
towards the other. Red edges represent negative FoF in the same manner, with darker and wider
edges for more negative FoF. These networks show that in the years 2010 and 2011 the overall
width of both red and blue edges is stronger than for the rest of the years. On the other hand, the
network of 2007 seems to be more divided in small clusters of positive FoF, while the later ones
seem to form larger clusters with lots of negative and positive FoF. In the following, we measure
modularity and polarization metrics for these networks, in order to quantify these observations.
6.2 Exact modularity and polarization
For the whole Eurovision network, we used heuristic methods to find optimal communities with
maximal modularity (Section 5.3). The case of the EU-15 subnetwork is much smaller, with
12 to 14 participating countries each year, allowing us to apply exhaustive search. For each
edition of Eurovision between 1997 and 2012, we enumerated all the possible partitions of nodes,
and computed both Qs(t) and Qfof (t), finding the global maxima of both. This required a
considerable amount of computing power, as the amount of partitions of a network of 14 nodes
is the 14th Bell number, which has an order of magnitude of 108.
The time series of the exact modularities and polarization in the EU-15 are shown in Figure 14.
Similarly to the whole Eurovision network, the scores modularity keeps below the FoF modularity,
only having a slightly higher value during 2007. The peak in 2007 validates our observation over
Figure 13, that in 2007 the countries of the EU-15 could be divided in some tightly connected
subcommunities. In addition, the EU-15 subnetwork does not show an increasing trend, neither
of score modularity (ρ(Qs, t) = 0.421, p-value = 0.1038), FoF modularity (ρ(Qfof , t) = 0.137,
p-value= 0.6132), nor polarization (ρ(Pol(t), t) = 0.42, p-value = 0.106).
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Figure 13: EU-15 subnetworks between 2007 and 2012. Each node represents a EU-15 country
taking part in Eurovision that year. Each directed edge has a darkness and width proportional
to the absolute value of the FoF coefficient from one country to another, colored blue for positive
FoF and red for negative FoF.
6.3 Relation between polarization and debt
A careful observation of the time series of polarization in the EU-15 subnetwork reveals a peaked
value in 2010 and 2011, coinciding with the loans and austerity measures in Portugal, Ireland,
Italy, Greece, and Spain. As a comparison, the polarization keeps relatively stable between 1997
and 2009, leading us to formulate the hypothesis that the polarization in the EU-15 subnetwork
is related to the European debt crisis. To empirically test this hypothesis, we need a quantitative
indicator of the state of the European economy. For this purpose, we use the interest rate of the
sovereign bonds of the countries of the Eurozone, which is commonly discussed as a method to
assess the state of the European economy13. In our analysis, we use the mean interest rate of
13http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_sovereign-debt_crisis
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Figure 14: Time series of votes modularity Qs (black points), FoF modularity Qfof (circles), and
polarization (gray triangles) for the EU-15 subnetwork.
the long-term sovereign bonds of the 12 Euro founder countries, all part of the EU-1514. The
dataset we used is based on harmonized combinations of primary and secondary markets, and
is provided by the European Central Bank 15. We used this mean interest rate as a standard
metric to quantify the evolution of the EU debt crisis.
In our analysis, we focus on the 11 editions of Eurovision since 2002, the year when the Euro was
introduced as a physical currency. Figure 15 shows the time series of monthly mean interest rate,
and polarization in Eurovision. Both polarization and interest rate jointly increase in 2010 and
2011, seemingly increasing polarization before the interest rate. We analyze this joint movement
by calculating the cross correlation between both time series, i.e. ρ(Pol(t), Int(t+∆t)), for values
of ∆t between −9 months and +9 months. The estimated values of ρ(Pol(t), Int(t + ∆t)) and
their 95% confidence intervals are shown in the left panel of Figure 16, having a maximum value
of 0.894 with p-value = 0.000205 for ∆t = +7. To deepen more in the shape of this correlation,
the right panel of Figure 16 shows the scatter plot of Pol(t) and Int(t+ 7). The solid line shows
the result of a linear regression of the form Int(Pol) = α+ βPol, where the estimates given by
least squares are α = −0.765 and β = 19.961. This regression has a residual error of 0.3775 and
an R2 of 0.7995, explaining almost 80% of the variance of the mean interest rate every December.
While this analysis shows the existence of a correlation between both time series, this does not
imply the existence of a causal relation. It seems unlikely that the results of a yearly cultural
event like Eurovision can influence the state of the economy of a considerable part of Europe.
Instead, the relation between these two variables can be interpreted as support for the theory
14Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, and
Finland.
15http://www.ecb.int/stats/money/long/html/index.en.html
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square indicates the bailout to the Spanish private banking sector.
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Figure 16: Left: cross correlation between Pol(t) and Int(t + ∆t), for ∆t ∈ [−9, 9], where error
bars show the 95% confidence interval of the Pearson’s correlation estimate. Right: scatter plot
of Pol(t) versus Int(t+ 7), with linear regression result.
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that both are influenced by a third component, or that both are manifestations of the same
phenomenon. This way, the polarization in Eurovision would be an early indicator for a social
and cultural phenomenon, which is followed by states of distrust in the economy of the involved
countries. To illustrate this theory, we show in Figure 15 the dates and amounts of loans from
the International Monetary Fund and the European Financial Stability Facility, until January
2013. The increased polarization in the contest is close in time to these events, being followed
later by the sovereign bond interest rate.
6.4 Additional analysis
The analysis explained above has two limitations: i) there is a free parameter ∆t that needs to
be accounted for, and ii) it is only based on the polarization amount EU-15 countries, ignoring
all other countries and metrics of modularity discussed in Section 5.2. This means that we might
fall into a Texas sharpshooter fallacy, finding patterns when focusing on subsets of random data.
In the following, we deepen our analysis in order to assess the robustness and limitations of our
statistical results.
To control if the correlation between Pol(t) and Int(t+ 7) is due to spurious fluctuations in the
mean interest rate, we also calculated the Pearson’s correlation coefficient between the polariza-
tion and the mean interest rate including all data in the following 7 months after the contest. The
result is a correlation coefficient of 0.692 with p-value = 0.01833, showing that time averages also
provide significant correlations between both time series. In addition, the correlation coefficients
for all ∆t ≥ 4 were significant at a 95% confidence interval, highlighting the relation from past
to future that lies between polarization and mean interest rate.
The selection of polarization among the EU-15 countries needs to be corrected, taking into
account the familywise error rate of the whole set of measurements. To control for this effect,
we computed all the correlations between the the mean interest rate after ∆t months, and the
metrics of polarization, scores modularity Qs, and FoF modularity Qfof , both for the EU-15
subnetwork and the whole Eurovision dataset. Then we applied a Bonferroni correction of the
p-value of these correlations, computing a conservative estimate of the probability of an incorrect
rejection of the null hypothesis.
Table 1 shows the correlation estimate and the original and corrected p-values for all the 6 metrics,
taking ∆t = 7. After correction, the correlation between the polarization in the EU-15 subnetwork
and the mean interest rate is still significant. The correlation between the polarization at the
whole Eurovision level can be initially accepted (p-value = 0.04231), but the correction reveals
that the chance of being mistaken is much higher (p-value > 0.25). We can appreciate this effect
by looking into the time series of the z-score of both polarizations, z(t) = (Pol(t)− µPol)/σPol.
We calculated µPol and σPol for the time period between 1997 and 2012, comparing the yearly
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value of both polarizations with their mean. The time series of these z-scores is shown in the
right panel of Figure 17. While the z-score of the polarization for all countries rarely goes beyond
1, the effect of increased polarization in the EU-15 subnetwork is evident in 2010 and 2011.
var set ρ(var, Int(t+ 7)) p-value corrected p-value
Pol(t) EU15 0.894 0.000205 0.001230134
Qs(t) EU15 0.056 0.8692 1
Qfof (t) EU15 −0.092 0.7869 1
Pol(t) All 0.619 0.04231 0.253835928
Qs(t) All 0.378 0.251 1
Qfof (t) All −0.381 0.2477 1
Table 1: Pearson correlation coefficients between the different metrics discussed here and the
lagged mean bond interest rate Int(t + 7), 95% confidence intervals, and p-values with Bonfer-
roni correction.
All the other variables did not show any significant correlation, leaving the polarization of EU-15
as the best metric to study the relation between culture in Eurovision and the economy in the
EU. For other values of ∆t, the results are similar as explained above, i.e. the correlation with
EU-15 polarization is only significant when ∆t ≥ 5, and the other metrics keep showing low
significance. The left panel of Figure 17 shows the cross correlation between the mean interest
rate and the EU-15 modularity for FoF, and for scores. We did not find any value for ∆t that
supports the assumption that there is some relation between the financial crisis and a possible
division of the EU-15 countries in Eurovision.
7 Discussion
We have studied the cultural relations among European countries through the behavioral biases
present in the Eurovision song contest. To do so, we gathered a dataset of the historical contest
outcomes, which aggregates the votes of large amounts of viewers who simultaneously vote by
phone calls and messages. Our approach is centered around the statistical analysis of this large-
scale dataset, producing metrics that compose a macroscope of the cultural cohesion in Europe
at large.
The first metric defined here is the Friend-or-Foe coefficient, a metric that reveals asymmet-
ric positive and negative relations between European countries. We validated how this metric
represents cultural affinity by comparing its historical values with previous data on European
cultures. This result is consistent with previous research [24], where the influence of culture was
taken into account to predict individual votes. In a more general setup, our findings suggest
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Figure 17: Left panel: time series of correlation coefficients between Int(t + ∆t) and EU-15
modularity for scores Qs and for FoF Qfof . Right panel: time series of z-scores for the polarization
of the EU-15 subnetwork and the whole Eurovision contest.
that there is a relation between cultural distance and voting biases that prevails through time,
showing the relation between known cultural relations and the FoF. Furthermore, we designed a
model of affinity in Eurovision contests that, when compared to null models, shows the influence
of cultural affinity in the FoF.
Using the FoF on empirical data, we found a community structure with higher modularity than
the equivalent using votes alone. The modularity of this FoF network keeps approximately con-
stant through time, while the modularity of the raw scores network increases every year. This
suggests that Eurovision participants adapt within the contest rules, in contrast to their cultural
biases, which seem to be define constant subcommunities according to their cultures.
Over this network data, we designed the metric of polarization, which detects changes in the
voting patterns among participating countries. Applying this metric to the votes between coun-
tries in the EU-15, we find a significant change in 2010 and 2011, the most turbulent years
with respect to debt and austerity measures in the EU. Our empirical analysis of the correlation
between polarization and EU debt indicators supports the hypothesis that both are related to
the political climate in the EU. This suggests, in turn, that political decisions can influence the
perception of culture across countries, and economic decisions of the involved states can change
the way societies relate to each other in the EU.
While we find that there is a positive lag between polarization and sovereign bond interest rates,
one can argue against the usage of Eurovision polarization as a predictor for interest rates. High
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states of polarization coocur with bailouts, which can be seen as the precursors of changes in the
interest rates. Nevertheless, our polarization metric provides a way to quantify how society reacts
to political decisions and the crisis in general, in a similar manner as sovereign bond interest rates
measure how the market reacts to the same phenomenon.
Additional datasets are available to extend our results. Wikipedia also contains the results of
the semifinals of the contest, which can be used to refine the Friend-or-Foe coefficient as an
aggregation of all the available data. Furthermore, our structural analysis can be combined with
statistics of online behavior, such as measures of search queries, website visits, Twitter posts, or
amounts of views and comments for the Youtube videos of participants. These extended datasets,
in turn, could be used to create testable predictors for the outcome of Eurovision contests.
A clear limitation of our analysis is the country level restriction given the data provided by
the Eurovision song contest. Cultures do not need to map to countries, as ethnic minorities or
pan-state cultures are neglected in this analysis. This limitation is present in the current state-
of-the-art studies [1], waiting for sources of cultural data at different levels of aggregation. Our
estimation of cultural affinity through the Friend-or-Foe coefficient depends on the way these
two relate to each other, which we explored through model simulations.
The modeling and analysis approach presented here can be applied to other contests, for example
in artist popularity competitions [10], or beauty contests. The Friend-or-Foe coefficient can be
adapted to other contest schemes, looking for alternative support on the way cultural affinity
creates voting biases. Finally, modularity and polarization can be used to create an“European
mood” metric, which relates to the economical and political decisions of the European Union,
and its member states. Applying this metric to future contests, we can investigate how political
decisions influence the state of cultural cohesion between the inhabitants of European countries.
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Uwe Serdült, Andreas Flache, and Frank Schweitzer for providing useful
comments and discussions.
References
[1] Ailon, G., Mirror, Mirror on the Wall: Culture’s Consequences in A Value Test of its Own
Design, Academy of Management Review 33 (2008) 885–904.
[2] Arenas, A., Duch, J., Fernández, A., and Gómez, S., Size reduction of complex networks
preserving modularity, New Journal of Physics 9 (2007) 176–176.
31/35
David García and Dorian Tanase:
Measuring Cultural Dynamics Through the Eurovision Song Contest
[3] Atkinson, Q. D. and Whitehouse, H., The cultural morphospace of ritual form, Evolution
and Human Behavior 32 (2011) 50–62.
[4] Axelrod, R., The Dissemination of Culture: A Model with Local Convergence and Global
Polarization, Journal of Conflict Resolution 41 (1997) 203–226.
[5] Axelrod, R. and Tesfatsion, L. S., A Guide for Newcomers to Agent-Based Modeling in the
Social Sciences (2006).
[6] Ball, P., Social science goes virtual, Nature 448 (2007) 647–648.
[7] Ball, P., Eurovision voting shows strain of economic crisis, Nature (2013).
[8] Castellano, C., Fortunato, S., and Loreto, V., Statistical physics of social dynamics, Reviews
of Modern Physics 81 (2009).
[9] Ceyhan, S., Shi, X., and Leskovec, J., Dynamics of bidding in a P2P lending service, in
Proceedings of the 20th international conference on World wide web - WWW ’11 (ACM
Press, New York, New York, USA, 2011), p. 547.
[10] Ciulla, F., Mocanu, D., Baronchelli, A., Gonçalves, B., Perra, N., and Vespignani, A., Beating
the news using social media: the case study of American Idol, EPJ Data Science 1 (2012)
8.
[11] Clauset, A., Shalizi, C. R., and Newman, M. E. J., Power-Law Distributions in Empirical
Data, SIAM Review 51 (2009) 661.
[12] Costa Filho, R., Almeida, M., Moreira, J., and Andrade, J., Brazilian elections: voting for a
scaling democracy, Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 322 (2003) 698–
700.
[13] Dekker, A., The Eurovision Song Contest as a ’Friendship’ Network, Connections 27 (2007)
53–58.
[14] Felbermayr, G. J. and Toubal, F., Cultural proximity and trade, European Economic Review
54 (2010) 279–293.
[15] Fenn, D., Suleman, O., Efstathiou, J., and Johnson, N. F., How does Europe Make Its
Mind Up? Connections, cliques, and compatibility between countries in the Eurovision Song
Contest, Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 360 (2006) 576–598.
[16] Fernandez, D. R., Carlson, D. S., Stepina, L. P., and Nicholson, J. D., Hofstede’s Country
Classification 25 Years Later, The Journal of Social Psychology 137 (1997) 43–54.
32/35
David García and Dorian Tanase:
Measuring Cultural Dynamics Through the Eurovision Song Contest
[17] Flache, A. and Macy, M. W., Small Worlds and Cultural Polarization, The Journal of
Mathematical Sociology 35 (2011) 146–176.
[18] Galam, S., Sociophysics: a personal testimony, Physica A: Statistical and Theoretical Physics
336 (2004) 49–55.
[19] Garas, A., Garcia, D., Skowron, M., and Schweitzer, F., Emotional persistence in online
chatting communities, Scientific Reports 2 (2012) 402.
[20] Garcia, D., Garas, A., and Schweitzer, F., Positive words carry less information than negative
words, EPJ Data Science 1 (2012) 3.
[21] Garcia, D., Kappas, A., Kuester, D., Theunis, M., Tsankova, E., Garas, A., Kuppens, P.,
and Schweitzer, F., Measuring the Dynamics of Individual Emotions Under Online Interac-
tion Through Subjective and Physiological Responses, in SPR 52nd annual meeting (New
Orleans, Lousiana, 2012).
[22] Gatherer, D., Comparison of Eurovision Song Contest Simulation with Actual Results Re-
veals Shifting Patterns of Collusive Voting Alliances., Journal of Artificial Societies and
Social Simulation 9 (2006) 1.
[23] Giles, J., Computational social science: Making the links, Nature 488 (2012) 448–450.
[24] Ginsburgh, V. and Noury, A. G., The Eurovision Song Contest. Is voting political or cul-
tural?, European Journal of Political Economy 24 (2008) 41–52.
[25] Gómez, S., Jensen, P., and Arenas, A., Analysis of community structure in networks of
correlated data, Physical Review E 80 (2009) 016114.
[26] Groeber, P., Schweitzer, F., and Press, K., How groups can foster consensus: The case of
local cultures, Journal of Aritifical Societies and Social Simulation 12 (2009) 1–22.
[27] Haan, M. A., Dijkstra, S. G., and Dijkstra, P. T., Expert Judgment Versus Public Opinion
? Evidence from the Eurovision Song Contest, Journal of Cultural Economics 29 (2005)
59–78.
[28] Hofstede, G., Culture’s Consequences: International Differences in Work-Related Values,
Vol. 1980 (SAGE, 1980).
[29] Jones, S. and Subotic, J., Fantasies of power: Performing Europeanization on the European
periphery, European Journal of Cultural Studies 14 (2011) 542–557.
33/35
David García and Dorian Tanase:
Measuring Cultural Dynamics Through the Eurovision Song Contest
[30] Kappas, A., Tsankova, E., Theunis, M., and Kuester, D., CyberEmotions: Subjective and
physiological responses elicited by contributing to online discussion forums, in Poster pre-
sented at the 51st Annual Meeting of the Society for Psychophysiological Research, Boston,
Massachusetts (2011).
[31] Klimek, P., Yegorov, Y., Hanel, R., and Thurner, S., It’s not the voting that’s democracy,
it’s the counting: Statistical detection of systematic election irregularities (2012), http:
//arxiv.org/abs/1201.3087.
[32] Kokko, A. and Tingvall, P. G., The Eurovision Song Contest, Preferences and European
Trade, Technical report (2012), http://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:ratioi:0183.
[33] Lazer, D., Pentland, A., Adamic, L. A., Aral, S., Barabasi, A.-L., Brewer, D., Christakis,
N. A., Contractor, N., Fowler, J. H., Gutmann, M., Jebara, T., King, G., Macy, M. W., Roy,
D., and Van Alstyne, M., Social science. Computational social science., Science 323 (2009)
721–723.
[34] Leskovec, J., Adamic, L. A., and Huberman, B. A., The dynamics of viral marketing, ACM
Transactions on the Web 1 (2007) 39.
[35] Mas, M., Flache, A., and Helbing, D., Individualization as driving force of clustering phe-
nomena in humans., PLoS computational biology 6 (2010) 1–8.
[36] McPhee, W. N., Formal theories of mass behavior (The Free Press of Glencoe, Collier-
Macmillian, London, 1963).
[37] Michard, Q. and Bouchaud, J.-P., Theory of collective opinion shifts: from smooth trends
to abrupt swings, The European Physical Journal B 47 (2005) 151–159.
[38] Newman, M., Analysis of weighted networks, Physical Review E 70 (2004) 056131.
[39] Orgaz, G. B., Cajias, R., and Camacho, D., A study on the impact of crowd-based voting
schemes in the ’Eurovision’ European contest, in Proceedings of the International Conference
on Web Intelligence, Mining and Semantics - WIMS ’11 (2011).
[40] Rosen, S., The Economics of Superstars, The American Economic Review 71 (1981) 845–
858.
[41] Rybski, D., Buldyrev, S. V., Havlin, S., Liljeros, F., and Makse, H. A., Scaling laws of human
interaction activity, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 106 (2009) 12640.
[42] Saavedra, S., Efstathiou, J., and Reed-Tsochas, F., Identifying the underlying structure
and dynamic interactions in a voting network, Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its
Applications 377 (2007) 672–688.
34/35
David García and Dorian Tanase:
Measuring Cultural Dynamics Through the Eurovision Song Contest
[43] Spierdijk, L. and Vellekoop, M., Geography, culture, and religion: Explaining the bias in
Eurovision song contest voting (2006), http://doc.utwente.nl/66198/1/1794.pdf.
[44] Wang, C. and Huberman, B. a., How Random are Online Social Interactions?, Scientific
Reports 2 (2012).
[45] Yair, G., ’Unite Unite Europe’ The political and cultural structures of Europe as reflected
in the Eurovision Song Contest, Social Networks 17 (1995) 147–161.
[46] Yair, G. and Maman, D., The Persistent Structure of Hegemony in the Eurovision Song
Contest, Acta Sociologica 39 (1996) 309–325.
[47] Zizek, S., The Sublime Object of Ideology (Verso, 1989).
35/35
